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Ethics in the Practice of Law. By Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1978. Pp. xviii, 159. 510.00.
Non-Answers to Tough Questions
Robert Kasanoff
Every lawyer, heaven knows, wants to be ethical these days, what
with grievance committees, grand juries, and the S.E.C. in full cry on
the lawyer hunt. Then, too, there is the old voice of conscience, and
malpractice suits, and explaining oneself to one's children. Naturally,
a tough, practical book that provided guidance for right action in
complex situations would be a godsend.
Professor Hazard's book is not it. Ethics in the Practice of Law' is the
product of that marvelous modem engine of intellectual accomplish-
ment, the weekend conference (in this case, the series of weekend con-
ferences). The reader is assured at the start that the book is the product,
not of the runts of the legal litter,2 but rather of those the English call
"Top People." The foreword sets the tone:
There were twenty-five participants in the discussion, all of them
members of the country's professional elite and most of them
lawyers. The lawyers included partners of large prestigious law
firms located in major cities, general counsel of large corpora-
tions, the chief counsel of a large legal aid agency, a federal judge,
the director of a foundation concerned with law and the legal
profession, lawyers of similar rank in the government, and pro-
fessors of law at nationally recognized universities.3
t- Partner, Kasanof & Schwartz, New York City.
1. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRAcTIcE OF LAw (1978) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
2. After all, even law schools make an occasional mistake.
3. Green, Foreword, at pp. ix-x.
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And Hazard's own words adopt and amplify this theme:
But this group's concept of its ethical responsibilities is of con-
sequence far out of proportion to its size. It includes a large frac-
tion of the practitioners who are best versed in technical legal
knowledge, most proficient in professional art, most highly com-
pensated, and most often occupants of positions of authority,
prestige, and influence within the profession. 4
Professor Hazard thus lines himself up with another marvelous new
breed, the social critic. Those fellows are much more modem than the
old-fashioned philosopher or thinker. Hazard, the social critic, has
distilled for the reader the result of a good deal of high talk of these
Top People. He tells us early on what the effort is:
Professional ethics, it was said, should be seen as general prin-
ciples of conduct, not as a corpus of specific rules; as a group of
principles that conflict with each other in many applications and
extensions, not an internally consistent code; as qualified im-
peratives that always have to yield at some point to competing
considerations; as resultants of encounters with tough practical
choices in real life, not abstract mandates laid down in advance;
as products of personal deliberation, not emanations from some
outside authority; as the expression of self-fulfillment and self-
control, not subordinancy [sic] to external discipline. When the
discussion developed, the same concept was suggested in less ana-
lytic and more allusive terms: "civility," "ethically pragmatic,"
"no Mickey Mouse," the conduct of a "decent human being." zi
The problem with this advice is simply that it is utterly unhelpful to
the attorney who needs guidance in his quest for ethical conduct. This
difficulty can be seen more clearly in Professor Hazard's treatment of
specific ethical dilemmas-for example, the problem of identifying
"who is the client?"
The problem of client identification can arise when the lawyer be-
comes entangled in a conflict of interest between a corporation's board
of directors and an officer of that corporation. Professor Hazard
illustrates the problem with the plot of an executive unburdening him-
self to the attorney about arguably improper conduct committed by
the executive or a subordinate. Is the attorney's first obligation to his-
client-the-corporation, or does his obligation of confidentiality to his-
client-the-officer prevent him from acting on this information? This
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guidance. Instead, he merely restates the potential perils of several
possible alternatives. The concept of a corporate entity could not
simply be ignored in any situation in which a conflict appeared, for
that would leave the lawyer "responsible to everyone or. to no one."
Similarly, the lawyer could not be required to choose who among
those concerned would be his client; that would be expensive and
impractical and would leave some individual or group underrepre-
sented. 7 Finally, the confidentiality rule could not be suspended with
respect to corporate entities without inhibiting open and full con-
sideration of complex legal problems.8 Are we thus left, as Hazard
fears, with the present situation, in which "the lawyer takes the rule
of confidentiality as a given and has to decide who his client is"?
If there is a way out, the reader receives no hint of it. Professor
Hazard suggests that, for the ethical attorney, "the question is not
whether [he] owes a duty 'to' his client and not 'to' others, but how
he should shape his courses of action given that he has duties to both
his clients and others."' 0 All well and good. The actual content of this
advice, however, is revealed to be neither original nor helpful: "the
lawyer has to let his judgment, perhaps one might say his conscience, be
his guide."". This intellectually unsatisfying advice need only be com-
pared with the old-fashioned ruminations of traditional essayists to
assess its true value. Consider, for example, the simple words of Herbert
Spencer: "Ethical systems are roughly distinguishable according as they
take for their cardinal ideas (1) the character of the agent; (2) the
nature of the motive; (3) the quality of his deeds; and (4) the results." -12
Given the need to make a decision with "competing considerations,"
Spencer's test helps decide specific cases. Hazard's does not.
Any discussion of ethics in the practice of law should provide one of
two things: either deep intellectual insights into ethics in general or
practical guidance for specific problems. One source of the latter kind
of information is the Code of Professional Responsibility,3 which gives







12. H. SPENCER, THE DATA OF ETHICS 32 (London 1879).
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) (replacing CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS (1908)).
14. Even in those instances in which the Code is relevant, it could stand improvement.
All lawyers ignore the Code section that requires them to report offenses committed by
other lawyers. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RuLE 1-103(A)
(lawyer with unprivileged knowledge of attorney's violation of disciplinary rule shall
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systems may go too far; 15 others may not go far enough. But Ethics in
the Practice of Law goes nowhere. Professor Hazard is adept, for ex-
ample, at poking holes in the Code's provisions governing confiden-
tiality.16 As in so many other of the book's discussions, however, the
reader is never treated to Hazard's own thoughts on the proper con-
fidentiality rule-except, perhaps, the rule to let one's conscience be
one's guide. Ethics in the Practice of Law is neither a helpful practical
book nor a satisfying philosophical work. It is simply Delphic.
No such book is complete without a misplaced medical analogy. In
a parting and mildly barbed piece of adulation for the participants in
the conference, the book concludes:
If practicing ethically includes performing with all the care and
thoroughness that one is capable of, practice on behalf of the big
corporations may be the most ethical kind. At any rate, critics of
corporation lawyers might also notice that the most proficient
doctors are at the big hospitals and not the county health services,
that the most proficient journalists are with the national media
and not the Utica Tribune, and that leading sociologists do not
teach in junior college. Then, of course, there is the money.17
More to the point, however, is the fact that the nature of medicine
means it is in fact the sick who are treated. Put in another way, a very
rich man does not ordinarily have the attention of dozens of leading
physicians attending to his head cold. The medical profession is not
mindlessly crowded with cosmetic plastic surgeons. Indeed, as bad as
the distribution of medical services may be, it has not generated wide-
spread public doubt as to the ethics of doctors or the ultimate worth of
the healing arts. Carl Sandburg's hearse-horse does not snicker when
it takes a doctor away. 18
report violation to appropriate authority). The minuscule number of complaints lodged
by attorneys might lead one to think that violations seldom occur; in fact, violations
simply go unreported.
15. Consider, for example, the absurd position that a lawyer's duty is entirely to his
client. See, e.g., Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. R v. 1469 (1966).
16. Pp. 21-33. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101
requires an attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client except in limited
circumstances. One exception to this general rule involves information concerning "ithe
intention of his client to commit a crime." Id., DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101(C)(3). Professor
Hazard argues that the distinction between confidences as to past illegal conduct (which
must, of course, be preserved) and those involving future illegal conduct is difficult to
maintain. Pp. 27-28, 30-31. He suggests that allowing either disclosure or preservation of
secrets as to both past and future conduct is more defensible than the present scheme. Id.
at 28-29.
17. P. 153.
18. Cf. C. SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in COMPLETE POEMS 189 (1950).
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Those of us who believe that the institution of lawfulness is served
by lawyers, and by and large served well, had better get to it: we must
explain what we are doing when it is right and change what we are
doing when it is wrong. The public appetite for on-the-one-hand, on-
the-other-hand discussions of legal ethics is pretty well sated.
No segment of the public now looks to the legal profession with
substantial admiration-except, perhaps, for its cunning. Businessmen
believe themselves choked with regulations and hamstrung by lawyers:
their own, their adversaries', the government's. Law-and-order zealots
believe that the administration of criminal justice is expensive, cum-
bersome, hypertechnical, and above all ineffectual. The poor believe
that the administration of justice is hopelessly weighted against them,
in terms both of its substance and of the unavailability of legal services.
Ralph Waldo Emerson's rebuke and question still ring clear: "It is
not an excuse any longer for his deeds, that they are the custom of his
trade. What business has he with an evil trade?" We had better have
much more serious and satisfactory answers in the future.
Serving Self, Not Others
Laura Nadert
This small book by Professor Hazard' reports on a two-part sym-
posium on the ethical lawyer. The symposium, held during the sum-
mer of 1976, was the first of several Seven Springs Center symposia on
the ethics of practicing professions. The twenty-five participants in the
discussion were members of the country's professional elite-primarily,
lawyers from prestigious law firms, large corporations, and govern-
ment agencies.2 Also present were a federal judge, a sociologist, two
political scientists, and several law professors. The composition of the
- Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution;
professor of anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.
1. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTIcE OF LAW (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
2. Green, Foreword, at pp. ix-x.
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symposium adumbrates the content and themes of this book, outlined
in Professor Hazard's lively introduction.
Hazard recognizes the importance of understanding the legal pro-
fession as it is actually practiced, for, as he notes, 3 the behavior of large
corporations and governmental agencies is influenced by the legal
advice that these organizations receive from the elite lawyers who serve
them. These lawyers, who constitute ten percent of the profession;
have influence far out of proportion to their number. As victims of
such concentrated power, Americans have become increasingly con-
cerned over the professional performance and responsibility of all
occupational elites.
Hazard's brief introduction mentions relatively little of the litera-
ture on lawyers' ethics.4 His selection reflects the bias of a profession
principally concerned with itself rather than with a wider public.5
Although Professor Hazard expresses concern in his introduction about
the power and social impact of the most powerful ten percent of the
legal profession, he rarely returns to such disquieting themes. 6 My
initial enthusiasm for this book was dampened as I moved from one
page of narrow discussion to another. Perhaps the last word in the
book-"money" 7-sums up the reason for my disappointment.
As an anthropologist, I find the book interesting for its therapeutic
function: consoling powerful members of the bar.8 The elite members
of the bar are in effect told that they need worry, not about the wide-
ranging impact of their activities, but only about how to deal with
their clients-a concern that dominates every discussion in the book,
whether about the adversary system, fees, advice, or conflicts of in-
3. P. xii.
4. See pp. xvii-xviii & nn.3, 4.
5. Some works have avoided this narrow bias. See, e.g., VERDIcTS ON LAWYERS (R. Nader
& M. Green eds. 1976); WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds. 1970);
Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 927 (1966).
6. Hazard makes no mention, for example, of the pioneering work of Mark Green
dealing with the Washington lawyers who are part of this legal elite. See M. GREEN, THE
OTHER GOVERNMENT (1975).
7. P. 153.
8. The ritual functions of such occasions were noted in Thurman Arnold's classic THE
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935), in his discussion of the "ceremonial" aspect of juris-
prudential writing and of trials. Id. at 60-71, 128-34. Lawrence Friedman describes law
reform commissions in a similar vein:
Justification is one of the major functions of law reform. Whatever value it has for
society, law reform is useful to the legal profession. It is part of the demonstration
that what the bar is and does is good for society .... Law reform makes it possible
for the top of the profession to strike poses of nobility and rectitude, to go before
the public in an attitude of high public spirit.
Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 11, 42 (1969).
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terest. The book reflects the specialized practitioner's passion for tech-
nical skill-a value that seems to override what most people think the
central purpose of law should be: a more just society. Several questions
occur to the anthropologist who encounters this lawyerly state of mind.
What kind of cognitive set leads lawyers to discuss judicial procedure
independent of the types of illegal or deviant action that stimulate the
need for procedure? Why are salary and therefore rank dependent upon
having the greatest ability (as self-defined), rather than upon serving
the greatest need? Why does a book on ethics in the practice of law
operate on the level of what is thought to be, rather than on what in
fact is?
Three themes seem central to understanding why Professor Hazard
organized the book as he did. The first theme relates to the concept
of evidence; the second, to the belief that legal ethics primarily in-
volves the dyadic relationship between lawyer and client; and the
third, to the question of competence, training, and power.
(1) Lawyers and the Concept of Evidence. Although lawyers use the
term "evidence" in common with scientists, the legal usage is not
merely different from that of the natural and behavioral sciences, but
is in fact antitheticalY For the lawyer, evidence is information that may
be useful in winning a case. For the scientist, evidence is used to test
a hypothesis or connection between collected facts; science is empirical
rather than argumentative. Because the book reflects the unempirical
bias of the legal professional, it fails to address satisfactorily the issues
central to an examination of ethics and legal practice.
Unfortunately, the non-scientific method that pervades the book
prevents the author from exploring and testing underlying assumptions
about practical legal ethics. Thus, while Professor Hazard lists a num-
ber of ideas worth implementing experimentally, he describes those
ideas as assumptions to reject, rather than assumptions to test.' 0 He
notes, for example, that "[t]he polemics ... assume or assert that large
corporations and major government organizations are prescient, power-
ful, and relentlessly self-serving, and attribute this potency in large
measure to the influence and manipulative abilities of their legal ad-
visors."11 Similarly, he observes that the bar's apologists "often exhibit
a myopic self-assurance that the lawyer's definition of the lawyer-client
9. Other scholars have commented upon this problem. See, e.g., D. BooRsrIN, THE
MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW (1941) (analyzing scientific and religious themes in legal
thought); Hart & McNaughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference in the Law, in
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relationship fulfills client expectations ... and is good for the general
public interest."' 12 Hazard's presentation suggests that such assumptions
must be rejected rather than tested. Hazard also seems to discount the
notion that lawyers and other professionals are often indifferent to what
many people would consider to be important ethical issues.
The book is replete with untested assertions. One of the most ex-
traordinary is the statement that "[t]he advocate who represents large
corporations rarely confronts the problems of client perjury or fabrica-
tion or destruction of evidence."' 13 Hazard presents no evidence to
support that claim, nor does he admit that there is evidence to the
contrary. 14 Elsewhere in the book, Hazard assumes that, in order to
recruit capable lawyers, the government must pay them large salaries. 15
There is no evidence that receiving large salaries encourages the honest,
competent, and moral practice of any profession. Even on matters of
interest to lawyers, the omissions are glaring. For example, little em-
pirical research has been conducted on the lawyer-client relationship
(in contrast to the many studies of the doctor-patient relationship).' 6
In the absence of research, Hazard's confidence in his assertions is
unjustifiable.
When Professor Hazard states that critics of corporate lawyers should
notice that "the most proficient doctors are at the big hospitals and
not the county health services,'1 7 he ignores the fact that, despite
greater professionalization and new medical discoveries, the quality
of health care in America has deteriorated. Just as it would not solve
12. Id.
13. P. 132.
14. Striking evidence of evidentiary destruction appears in Mark Green's book on
Washington lawyers. See M. GREEN, supra note 6. Green, himself a lawyer, described a
practice he called "burn-bagging." He said: "It is not unknown for clients and counsel
either to destroy subpoenaed evidence (which is criminal) or, more commonly, to period-
ically purge files of potentially damaging documents (euphemistically called a 'document-
retention policy')." Id. at 69. Unlike Hazard, Green has support for his observations: a
memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division
about the "increasing practice on the part of substantial business concerns [to] destroy
documents periodically . . . because of the advice of sophisticated lawyers." Id. at 70.
Green was not referring solely to "shyster" firms; he discusses an instance in which mem-
bers of Covington & Burling caused the destruction of information about violations of
the law. Id.; cf. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of
Ralph Nader) (citing 42 examples of evidentiary destruction). See generally Note, Legal
Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
15. P. 118.
16. A few studies of lawyer-client relations have recently been published. See, e.g., D.
ROSENTHAL, L AWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); Sudnow, Normal Crimes:
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our health care problems to train more doctors like those who practice
at large hospitals, neither would it improve the practice of law in
America to increase the number of corporate lawyers or the refine-
ments of their practice. Major improvement can occur only when
corporate lawyers become more concerned with the public con-
sequences of their actions.
(2) The Dyadic Relationship. The book's organization mirrors the
tendency of lawyers to confine questions of legal ethics within the
dyadic lawyer-client relationship. Hazard mentions in passing that
a lawyer may have duties to third persons that override a client's
demands,' and he considers the problems of identifying the "client."' 9
Hazard alludes to the possibility that lawyers may owe some duty to
consumers, employees, and "denizens of 'the environment.' "-0 But
Hazard never discusses this possibility at length; perhaps he thinks it
too remote to merit serious consideration.
Hazard's narrow focus typifies the tunnel vision of many profes-
sionals. The legal profession, and even many law schools, concentrate
upon the solution of precisely defined legal problems, rather than
upon analysis of broader social consequences of lawyers' actions. Law-
yers are trained to think of problems in terms of technical detail,
rather than in terms of social policies. In his classic work on the symbols
of government, 21 Thurman Arnold quoted Harvard Professor Thomas
Reed Powell's description of a related aspect of the legal mind: "If you
think that you can think about a thing inextricably attached to some-
thing else without thinking of the thing which it is attached to, then
you have a legal mind. '"2 The legal mind may consider legal ethics in
relation to the client's needs as well as the lawyer's, but it is condi-
tioned to ignore the question of the obligation of lawyers to a wider
public.
As originally conceived, the dyadic lawyer-client paradigm, however
much it slighted broad societal considerations, did recognize the law-
yer's paramount interest in defending the rights of individuals and
fulfilling his duty to the client. But that conception has not adapted
to the modem situation, in which the client is more often a giant
corporation or agency, not a natural person. The distinction between
individual and organizational clients surely needs to be examined in




21. T. ARNOLD, suPra note 8.
22. Id. at 101.
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erally, rejecting the bar's "idealized version" of its "individual client" 23
and observing that the "mid-Victorian image" of lawyer-client relations
applies to criminal cases but not to the tie between corporations and
their general counsel.24 Although Hazard contends that the "criminal
defense model" is an inappropriate source of rules for lawyers in other
contexts,2 5 he offers no systematic discussion of this distinction or of
its relation to the social duties of ethical lawyers.
Hazard's fleeting references to the public obligations of the legal
profession are almost lost in his extensive discussions of the daily
bread-and-butter issues faced by lawyers with corporate clients. Yet
law is a public profession: lawyers are licensed by the state, granted a
near-monopoly of access to the judicial system, and receive millions
of dollars in tax-deductible fees.26 This public status entails a scale of
obligations ignored by Hazard outside his introduction.2 7 The Seven
Springs Conferences should have been more than an opportunity for
corporate lawyers and allied professionals to discuss the problems in
their daily work schedules. The conference could have been an op-
portunity to pull back from immediate ethical questions relating to
specific corporate clients in order to discuss the wider social impact
of lawyers' actions. If the elite refuse to address their public obligations,
the next conference might do better to convene the clients of lawyers-
or, better yet, the potential clients who never gain access to the legal
elite.
(3) Professional Training and Competence. Clients and potential
clients would no doubt question how the establishment sets standards of
competence, how lawyers are trained to deal competently with their
problems, and how attorneys interact in an essentially self-regulating
profession.
Hazard never considers whether the educational institutions that
have given elite lawyers their merit badges are the best means of pre-
paring professionals to meet society's needs. Tests and credentials are
formal mechanisms used to ensure professional competence. The pre-
vailing assumption-that a selective, elitist profession can provide better
service to consumers-seems to be utterly wrong; the more exclusionary




26. Individuals cannot deduct routine legal expenses, but corporations can deduct pay-
ments to lawyers as ordinary and necessary business expenses. See B. BIrTKER & L. STONE,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 320-28, 368-69 (5th ed. 1980).
27. P. xiii.
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with its own narrow self-interest, rather than with the needs of the
people being served.28
Historians have documented the shift in models of relation from
what was essentially a vertical model, emphasizing the relationship
between a professional and client, to a horizontal model emphasizing
the relationship among professions: "Thou shalt not compete with thy
fellow professions."29 In her discussion of the "ethics of noncompeti-
tion," Corinne Gilb notes that the development of laws restricting
the practice of professions coincided with the growth of concern for
harmony among professionals. Nineteenth century professional ethics
were primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual
and those served. Beginning in the 1870's, professional organizations
gave a new emphasis to professional solidarity.30
Professional language plays an important role in the socialization of
professionals by creating an identity within the profession and by
isolating professionals from non-professionals. Jargon impairs the
client's ability to evaluate professional competence. The mysteries of
professional language are perpetuated by educational institutions and
elite practitioners.31 The total process is one that encourages what
might be called professional deformation. 32 Distancing of professional
and client interests, I suspect, is associated with an absence of profes-
sional reality-testing and with decreased competence (whether measured
by the consumer of professional services or observed by major social
thinkers).
28. See L. Nader, The Sub-Culture of Professionals as it Relates to Professional Per-
formance and Credentialism (April 28, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal). See gen-
erally White, The Definition of Legal Competence: Will the Circle Be Unbroken? 18
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 641 (1978).
29. C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES 67 (1966) (footnote omitted).
30. See id. (to reinforce homogeneity and sense of community, "professions have enacted
rules relating to ethics that allow the profession simultaneously to retain power and to
present a collective image of 'dignity and honor.' Unity requires that competition be
curtailed.")
31. A good example is BARRON'S How TO PREPARE FOR THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
TEST (E. Epstein, J. Shostak, L. Troy, & N. Horvath eds. rev. ed. 1977). In discussing the
"principles and cases" questions, the guidebook warns:
Read the directions carefully. You will be told that for the purpose of the test you
are to assume the principle of law to be a valid one, whether or not your personal
experience or knowledge leads you to believe the principle to be incorrect ...
Remember that these questions do not presuppose any specific legal knowledge on
your part; you are to arrive at your answers by the ordinary processes of logical
reasoning.
Id. at 267.
32. Cf. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 251-54 (rev. ed. 1968) (dis-
cussing Veblen's, Dewey's, and Warnotte's analyses of attributes of bureaucrats and pro-
fessionals); Taylor, Law School Stress and the "Deformation Professionelle," 27 J. LEGAL
ED. 251 (1975).
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It has been said repeatedly that there is no way to measure legal
competence.33 After five years of research on American complaints,34
my colleagues and I were left with a gnawing question: why, when we
are selecting the best and the brightest, do we have such a multitude of
complaints about American professional competence? Traits that satisfy
the specialized standards of the legal profession may fail to satisfy the
needs of the public. Professional competence is an ethical issue, and
it calls for greater integration of the profession with the society that it
serves. Our generation understands well the danger of knowing more
and more about less and less.
As has often been recognized in the past decade, the best legal minds
are not working on the most important and difficult problems. The
law is being used to benefit the powerful.35 It is admirable that Hazard
is concerned with ethics and the relation between lawyers and their
powerful clients. Early in his book he is perceptive in calling attention
to the constraints of the work-setting of the modern professional.30 In
his concluding remarks he also notes that "the modern legal advisor is
an actor in the situations in which he gives advice. And as such he is
accountable." 37 Lawyers influence the quality of food that we eat, the
drugs that we take, and the planes that we fly; in short, they affect the
quality of life for us all. Unfortunately, between the front and the
back of this book, the reader does not get a sense of the substantive
impact of modern corporate law practice.
33. The LSAT's, in particular, have come under sustained fire. See, e.g., Nader &
Nairn, Startling Admissions, STUDENT LAW., March 1980, at 28. Some commentators have
advanced proposals for measuring legal competence. The Cahns, for example, use the
consumer model to make such a measure. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 5, at 931. Hazard
uses another measure of competence: the corporate law firm, which supposedly enables
lawyers to develop the highest levels of professional skills. See p. 152.
34. In the early 1970's I initiated a project on how Americans complain about pro-
fessional services. Anthropology students from various universities, as well as young
lawyers, assisted in this research, which was supported by the Carnegie Corporation. Some
of the conclusions from the study appeared in Nader, Disputing Without the Force of
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979). The basic data will appear in L. NADER, No ACCESS TO LAw:
ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYsrEss (forthcoming 1980).
35. See Nader & Serber, Law and the Distribution of Power, in THE UsES OF CON-
TROVERSY IN SOCIOLOGY 273 (L. Coser & 0. Larsen eds. 1976).
36. P. xv.
37. P. 151.
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